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RECENT DECISIONS
AGENCY-SUIT BY WIFE AGAINST NEGLIGENT
HUSBAND'S EMPLOYER
Employee of defendant corporation used a company car for
a purely personal mission. Vhile a passenger, the employee's
wife sustained injury resulting from the husband's negligence.
Held: Wife's action against employer was maintainable under
doctrine of respondeat superior, notwithstanding that the husband
was acting outside the scope of employment, and a similar suit
for personal injuries against the spouse would be barred. May
v. Palm Beach Chemical Co., - Fla. , 77 So. 2d 468 (1955).
It is a well established general rule that in the absence of a
statute the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for its negligent
operation by a third person "unless a relationship exists of mas-
ter and servant or principal and agent, and at the time of the
accident the vehicle was being used in pursuit of the owner's
business". MECHEM, AGENCY § 364 (4th ed. 1952). Florida courts,
evincing a preference for risk distribution, have consistently
granted recovery in this type of case by utilizing legal fictions
which dispense with certain elements of respondeat superior, in-
cluding acting within the scope of employment, and existence of
a master-servant or principal-agent relationship. Hern v. Butler,
101 Fla. 1125, 132 So. 815 (1931) ; Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. An-
derson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920).
The majority of American courts permit the action against
the employer-owner on an agency theory where the injury oc-
curred in the scope of general employment. Mullally v. Langen-
berg Bros. Grain Co., 339 Mo. 582, 98 S. W. 2d. 645 (1936) ; Le Sage
v. Le Sage, 224 Wis. 57, 271 N. W. 369 (1937).
Many earlier decisions had denied recovery in these instances
on a theory that since the owner is not personally at fault he
has an action over against the negligent spouse, thus ultimately
casting the burden of financial loss onto the family unit. Emerson
v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N. W. 297
(1927). Later decisions such as the instant case have recognized
this apparent difficulty and have met the problem with the practical
realization that the negligent spouse is likely to be "judgment
proof", and emphasizing that there is no universal identity be-
tween husband and wife. Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198
N. E. 230 (1936).'
Under common law auspices the New York courts had favored
a risk distribution through the employer-owner of the vehicle.
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This policy was attributable to the court's feeling that the owner
would be better able to pay for any ensuing damage, and would
be the logical person to carry liability insurance to cover and
distribute such risks. Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co.,
249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928); PRossER, TORTS § 66 (1941).
The majority of jurisdictions (Florida not included) pres-
ently have statutes which impose automatic liability on the owner
for the negligent operation of the vehicle when used with his
express or implied permission. E. g., N. Y. Vehicle and Traffic
Law § 59.
Jurisdictions which do not allow this action against the em-
ployer are frequently those which prohibit personal injury suits
between husband and wife, the rationale being that it would be
contrary to public policy to permit recovery against the employer-
owner indirectly, where the action would be barred against the
negligent spouse directly. Miltimore v. Milford Motors, 89 N. H.
272, 197 A. 330 (1938).
Presently in New York this situation is covered by Section
59 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, providing (inter alia) that the
owner of a motor vehicle shall be liable for injury caused by
anyone legally using said vehicle, in pursuit of the owner's business
or otherwise.
Prior to 1937 Section 109 of the New York Insurance Law
provided that all contracts of insurance were to include under
the liability coverage any personal or property damage caused
by the named insured or his permittee. In 1937 the legislature
enacted Section 57 of the Domestic Relation Law which, in dero-
gation of the common law rule, authorizes a cause of action for
personal injuries between spouses. Simultaneously with the latter
enactment, Section 109 of the Insurance Law was amended as
follows: "no such policy . . . shall be deemed to insure
against any liability of an insured for injuries to his or her spouse,
unless otherwise provided for in the insurance contract." Thus
ultimately the legislature authorized a cause of action for personal
injuries between spouses while shielding the insurer from sham
claims by means of collusive actions between husband and wife.
In New York the consequences of an action against the em-
ployer under similar circumstances as in the instant case would
probably result in the employer impleading the negligent spouse.
See C. P. A. § 193-a. Thus, assuming that the husband is not
"judgment-proof", the family wealth would remain the same, ex-
cept as diminished by the cost of litigation.
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